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CONDORCET CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND MAXIMAL ELEMENTS 
 








Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), 
provided they exist, but this property does not hold in the more general case of weak 
tournaments. In this paper we analyze the relationship between the usual choice 
functions and the set of maximal elements in weak tournaments. We introduce choice 
functions selecting maximal elements, whenever they exist. Moreover, we compare these 
choice functions with those that already exist in the literature. 
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the literature on preferences, there are a great number of papers devoted
to the analysis of the existence of maximal elements, as they are considered
”the best ones”. In order to ensure the existence of maximal elements in all
feasible subsets of X, the acyclicity of the binary relation P is a necessary
condition; but there are many contexts in which requiring acyclicity of the
binary relation a priori is too rigid a restriction. This is the case of realistic
social decision mechanisms as, for instance, majority voting in which cycles
may appear. Moreover, requiring acyclicity, together with some other axioms,
in social decision functions gives rise to impossibility results. As pointed out
by Schwartz (1986), ”... the impossibility theorems show acyclicity to be
unreasonable as a general assumption about collective preference -although
not necessarily unreasonable when restricted to special situations. It seems
unreasonable as a general assumption about individual preferences as well”.
This fact has inspired many papers on the problem of choosing the
best elements when binary relations are not necessarily acyclic, as in the
case of tournaments (asymmetric and complete binary relations), or weak
tournaments where the binary relation is merely complete (this generalization
of the notion of tournaments is interesting because it allows indiﬀerences or
ties). In these contexts, because of the non-existence, in general, of maximal
elements, it is not quite clear what the deﬁnition of ”the best elements” is,
and several solution concepts (choice functions),f r o mb o t ht h ep o s i t i v ea n d
the axiomatic points of view, have been introduced.Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 4
In the case of tournaments, the relation between the selected elements
for any well-deﬁned choice function and the maximal elements is always
clear: the existence of maximal elements cannot be ensured, but if there
is a maximal element, it will be the one that beats all other alternatives
(Condorcet winner) and the choice function selects precisely such an element.
In tournaments, therefore, the choice set and the set of maximals (if it is non-
empty) coincide.
In the case of weak tournaments, however, the relationship between
m a x i m a le l e m e n t sa n dc h o i c ef u n c t i o n si sn o ts oc l e a ra n d ,a sw ew i l ls h o w ,
the choice functions deﬁned in the literature for this case do not always
coincide with the set of maximal elements: some of them select a larger set
(with regard to the inclusion relation), while others may select elements of
which none of them is in fact maximal.
W ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nd e ﬁning a choice function, in the framework of weak
tournaments, such that it chooses maximal elements, whenever they exist,
and then generalizes what happens in the case of tournaments.
2 Weak Tournaments and Maximal Elements
Let us consider the following deﬁnitions and notation.
A tournament T =( X,U) consists of a non-empty ﬁnite
set of alternatives X and a binary relation U deﬁned on
X which is complete [∀x,y ∈ X, x  = y ⇒ xUy or yUx] and
asymmetric [xUy ⇒ not(yUx)].A weak tournament W =Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 5
(X,R) is a generalization of the previous concept which
only requires strong completeness of the binary relation
R [∀x,y ∈ X, ⇒ xRy or yRx]. W ed e n o t et h ef a m i l yo f
tournaments by T ,w h i l eW represents the family of weak
tournaments.
A choice function F is a map that assigns a non-empty choice
set (the selected alternatives)i nX, to each tournament or weak
tournament. Given two choice functions F, G, F  = G, it is said
that F is contained in G (or that F is more discriminating than
G), denoted as F ⊂ G, if for all weak tournaments W =( X,R),
F(W) ⊆ G(W).
Given a weak tournament W =( X,R), for each subset A of X,
the maximal set is denoted by M(A,R)={x ∈ A | xRy, ∀
y ∈ A, y  = x}. Under the standard interpretation, M(A,R) can
be interpreted as the best elements in A, for the binary relation R.
From R,i t sasymmetric part P is deﬁned as follows: xPy if and
only if [xRy and not(yRx)].T h esymmetric part of R, (in which
two elements tie, or are indiﬀerent), is deﬁned as follows: xIy
if and only if [xRy and yRx]. The transitive closure of a binary
relation R on X, denoted by R∞, is deﬁned as follows: xR∞y if
and only if there are x1,x 2,...,xn ∈ X such that x = x1 Rx 2 R ...
Rx n = y. The transitive closure of the relation P on X is deﬁned
analogously: xP ∞y if and only if there are x1,x 2,...,x n ∈ X suchCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 6
that x = x1 Px 2 P. . .Px n = y. Note that, in general, P∞ does
not coincide with the asymmetric part of R∞.
Given a weak tournament W =( X,R) and A ⊆ X, W |A denotes
the weak tournament (A,R |A) where R |A is the restriction of
R on the subset A. We now use the following function gW :




   




or, in a matrix form, if X = {x1,...,x r},
GW =( ( GW)ij)r×r , (GW)ij = gW(xi,x j).
Remark 1 A comparison function (Dutta and Laslier, 1999) is a
generalization of weak-tournaments in which the skew-symmetric function
gW admit the possibility of taking into account the intensity of the preference
of x over y. For comparison functions gW with values in {-1,0,1}, we obtain
the particular case of weak-tournaments.
2.1 Choice functions for weak tournaments
The choice functions deﬁned for tournaments satisfy the following property
(Condorcet choice functions):
For all T =( X,U) ∈ T ,
F(T)={x} whenever xUy, ∀y ∈ X, x  = yCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 7
or, in other words,
F(T)=M(X,U) whenever the maximal set is non-empty.
As we have already mentioned, this is not the case for choice functions deﬁned
for weak tournaments. In order to show this, we analyze Condorcet choice
functions that have been generalized to the context of weak tournaments:
The top cycle, denoted as TC,is the ﬁrst reference for a solution
to a tournament T =( X,U) ∈ T , and it is deﬁned by the
elements x ∈ X such that xU∞y for all y ∈ X, y  = x. Its
extension for weak tournaments TC(W), known as the GOCHA
set (Schwartz, 1972), is deﬁned as the maximal elements in X of
the transitive closure R∞.
The uncovered set (Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1980) of a tournament
T =( X,U) ∈ T , is the subset UC(T) of X, whose members are
maximal elements of the covering relation deﬁned by: xc o v e r s
y if and only if [xUy and (yUz implies xUz)]. Dutta (1988),
deﬁnes the minimal covering set on T , denoted as MC(T),b a s e d
on the idea of covering sets. A covering set of a tournament
T =( X,U) ∈ T is a non-empty subset A of X such that
UC(T |A)=A, and for all x ∈ X − A, x / ∈ UC(T |A∪{x}).
The minimal covering is a covering set B such that no proper
subset of B is a covering set. Dutta (1988) proves that for any
tournament T, such a subset always exists and is unique. These
two choice functions have been extended for weak tournamentsCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 8
(Peris and Subiza, 1999) in such a way that they satisfy the same
axioms as in tournaments.
Another important solution concept for tournaments that has
been generalized to weak tournaments is the Bipartisan set
(Laﬀond, Laslier and Le Breton, 1993). For a tournament
T =( X,U) ∈ T , consider the following two-player symmetric
zero-sum game: both players have X as their set of pure strategies
and the payoﬀ of the ﬁrst player is given by the function gT.
This game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies and the
authors deﬁne the choice function BP(T) (the Bipartisan set)
as the support of such an equilibrium. The extension of the
Bipartisan set to comparison functions (Dutta and Laslier, 1999),
called the Essential set, ES(W), is deﬁned as the union of the
supports of all the Nash equilibria of the two-player symmetric
zero-sum game, in which both players have X as their set of pure
strategies and the payoﬀ of the ﬁr s tp l a y e ri sg i v e nb yt h ef u n c t i o n
gW.
Laﬀond, Laslier and Le Breton (1995) provide a set-theoretical
comparison of the previous choice functions in the context of
tournaments. Speciﬁcally, they obtain that in T
BP ⊂ MC ⊂ UC ⊂ TC.
For weak tournaments the set-comparisons are the same (see Peris
and Subiza, 1999; Dutta and Laslier, 1999),Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 9
ES ⊂ MC ⊂ UC ⊂ TC.
When applied to tournaments, all the above-mentioned solutions are
Condorcet choice functions, so that if there is a maximal element, all solutions
a g r e ei nt h e i rc h o i c eo ft h eC o n d o r c e tw i n n e r .L e tu ss h o wt h a tt h i si sn o t
necessarily true when it is applied to weak tournaments.
Example 1 Let W =( X,R) t h ew e a kt o u r n a m e n tw h e r eX = {a,b,c}





2,0)) is an equilibrium of the zero-sum game deﬁned by this
weak tournament.
In the following proposition we prove that the maximal elements, when
they exist, are included in the essential set, and therefore, in the minimal
covering, the uncovered set and the top cycle.
Proposition 1 Given a weak tournament W =( X,R),
M(X,R) ⊂ ES(W).
Proof. Consider the zero-sum game deﬁned by the payoﬀ function gW
associated to the weak tournament W =( X,R). Then if x ∈ M(X,R),
gW(x,y) ∈ {0,1} for all y ∈ X;s i n c egW(x,x)=0 , (x,x) is a saddle-point
and x ∈ ES(W). Moreover, Example 1 shows that this inclusion may be
proper.Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 10
2.2 Generalized Condorcet condition
To expect acyclicity of the binary relation (that is, to insist on the existence
of maximal elements in every subset of the feasible set) is not reasonable
when considered as a global assumption. Nevertheless, it is possible that
maximal elements exist in some subsets (for instance, in subsets with just
two elements). Whenever maximal elements exist, a desirable property of a
choice function is that it selects these maximal elements exclusively. Let us
call the choice functions that satisfy this property general Condorcet choice
functions:
Deﬁnition 1 Ac h o i c ef u n c t i o nF deﬁned in the family of weak tournaments
is said to be a g-Condorcet choice function if for each weak tournament
W =( X,R) ∈ W, such that M(X,R)  = ∅ then F(W)=M(X,R).
If we have a tournament, this notion corresponds to that of a Condorcet
choice function. Moreover, if the binary relation is acyclic, a g-Condorcet
choice function coincides with the concept of a rational choice function
(for this reason, we will call rational the choice functions satisfying the g-
Condorcet property). As shown in Example 1, the afore-mentioned solution
concepts for weak tournaments do not satisfy this condition, since they may
all choose ”bad” candidates (elements which are not in M(X,R)). This fact
is somewhat related with the notions of Type1-Type2 choice functions (Dutta
and Laslier, 1999). Most of choice functions deﬁned in the literature about
weak-tournaments are Type 1 choice functions, which requires that in theCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 11
situation shown in Example 1, the whole set X = {a,b,c} must be chosen.
In this paper we are interested in Type 2 (not Type 1) choice functions.
3 g-Condorcet Choice Functions for Weak Tournaments
Before introducing new choice functions satisfying the g-Condorcet property,
we need some notation. For any weak tournament W =( X,R), consider the
following equivalence relation deﬁned on X : x ≈ y if and only if x = y or
[xP∞ya n dy P ∞x]. We denote the quotient set by X,a n db ycl(x;W) the
class in X containing the element x ∈ X [if there is no risk of confusion, we
merely write cl(x)]. We now deﬁne the quotient relation P on X as follows:
for all cl(x),cl(y) ∈ X ,
cl(x)Pcl(y) if and only if
a) cl(x)  = cl(y), and
b) there exist a ∈ cl(x), b ∈ cl(y) such that aP ∞b.
And, from P we deﬁne
cl(x)Rcl(y) if and only if not[cl(y)Pcl(x)].
It is easy to prove that P is an asymmetric and transitive binary relation,
so that M(X,R) is a non-empty set (see Peris and Subiza, 1994). We know
that, given a preference relation R, maximal elements exist if and only if
the quotient relation has maximal classes with cardinality 1. Therefore, if
we wish to deﬁne a choice function that satisﬁes the g-Condorcet condition,Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 12
we must consider only the classes with cardinality 1, whenever they exist.
This fact induces us to select the maximal classes with the lowest possible
cardinalities: we denote the classes in M(X,R) with minimal cardinality by
mcM(W),
mcM(W)={cl(x) ∈ M(X,R) | #(cl(x)) ≤ #(cl(y)), ∀ cl(y) ∈ M(X,R)}
where
#(·) denotes the cardinality of a ﬁnite set.
Deﬁnition 2 The Rational Top Cycle choice function assigns, to each





I nt h ef o l l o w i n gt h e o r e m ,w ep r o v et h a tt h eR a t i o n a lT o pC y c l ei sag -
Condorcet choice function that generalizes the top cycle to the case of weak
tournaments.
Theorem 1
a) The Rational Top Cycle is a g-Condorcet choice function.
b) For all tournaments T =( X,U) ∈ T , TC∗(T)=TC(T).
c) TC∗ ⊂ TC.
Proof.
a) For each weak tournament W =( X,R) such that M(X,R)  = ∅, each
maximal element constitutes, by itself, a maximal class in M(X,R),a l t h o u g h
other maximal classes may exist in the quotient relation. The union of the
classes with minimal cardinality coincides with the maximal set.Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 13
b) If T =( X,U) ∈ T , there is just one maximal class on M(X,R) which
is precisely the Top Cycle of this tournament, TC(T).






and Example 1 shows that TC∗(W) m a yb es t r i c t l yi n c l u d e di nTC(W),
TC∗(W)={a},T C (W)={a,b,c}.
Deﬁnition 3 The Rational Essential choice function assigns, to each






a) The Rational Essential is a g-Condorcet choice function.
b) For all tournament T =( X,U), ES∗(T)=ES(T).
c) ES∗ ⊂ ES.
Proof.
a) Analogous to part a) i nt h ep r e v i o u sT h e o r e m .
b) If T =( X,U) ∈ T , there is just one maximal class on M(X,R) which
is precisely the Top Cycle of this tournament, TC(T). Therefore,
ES∗(T)=ES(T |TC(T))=ES(T).
c) Let x ∈ ES∗(W);t h e nx ∈ ES(W |cl(x)),w h e r ecl(x)∈mcM(W).L e t
gWcl(x) be the payoﬀ function associated to the weak-tournament (W |cl(x)).
Then, x ∈ supp(p∗),w h e r e(p∗,p ∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum gameCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 14
with payoﬀ function gWcl(x). Let us consider the following strategy of the game
deﬁned by gW, the payoﬀ function associated to the weak-tournament W,
p (y)=p∗(y) for all y ∈ cl(x),
p (y)=0 otherwise.
Let us see that (p ,p  ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game gW. To do so, it is
suﬃcient (see, for instance, Owen, 1982) to prove that






p (y), and that







Condition (1) is fulﬁlled, since supp(p )=supp(p∗). In order to verify (2),













In this case, therefore, condition (2) is fulﬁlled. If, on the other hand,







Finally, Example 1 shows that the inclusion may be proper.
Remark 2 In order to show that the inclusion may be proper even in the
case where no maximal element exists, we use the following example: let
W =( X,R) be the weak tournament in which X = {x1,...,x 7} and the
function gW is given by the following matrixCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 15











               

Then, ES∗(W)={x1,x 2,x 3} and ES(W)=X.
J u s ta sw ed i dw i t ht h eRational Essential choice function, we can also
deﬁne the Rational Uncovered Set, or the Rational Minimal Covering as
extensions of the corresponding choice functions on T that satisfy the g-









We have focused our attention on the Essential set, since it is more
discriminating than the other choice functions.
4 An Undominated Selection
Apart from introducing the Essential Set (in the more general framework
of comparison functions), Dutta and Laslier (1999) analyzed it axiomatically
and found that, although it is contained in the Minimal Covering, it may stillCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 16
contain elements that are weakly dominated. To obtain an undominated
selection of the Essential Set, they deﬁne a sequential elimination of
dominated elements. But, in Dutta and Laslier’s words, ”...this process
does produce a well-deﬁned choice function. Unfortunately, the function
does not have very good axiomatic properties [in particular, it does not
satisfy Monotonicity]. Hence, it seems that the selection of weakly dominated
alternatives is one price that has to be paid in the transition [from the case
of tournaments] to the more complex world of comparison functions [which
includes, as a particular case, weak tournaments].”
As we have proven in Theorem 2, the Rational Essential set is included in
the Essential set, but as we will see in Example 2, it may still contain weak
dominated alternatives. In this section, we deﬁne a selection of the Rational
Essential set satisfying monotonicity, which no longer contains dominated
alternatives. First of all, deﬁnitions of weak dominance and monotonicity are
introduced, and then it is proven that a g-Condorcet choice function is not, in
general, compatible with the elimination of weakly dominated alternatives.
Deﬁnition 4 Given a weak tournament W =( X,R), it is said that
alternative y is weakly dominated by alternative x in such a weak
tournament if for all z ∈ X, gW(x,z) ≥ gW(y,z), with at least one strict
inequality. The undominated set is deﬁned as those alternatives in X
which are not weakly dominated by any other alternative,
UD(W)={x ∈ X | no element in X weakly dominates x}.
Deﬁnition 5 Ac h o i c ef u n c t i o nF deﬁned in the family of weak tournamentsCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 17
satisﬁes Undominance if for all weak tournaments W =( X,R), F(W) ⊆
UD(W).
Undominance is a desirable property, but it is, in general, incompatible
with the g-Condorcet property, since maximal elements may be weakly
dominated. The following example shows this fact.
Example 2 Let W =( X,R) be the weak tournament in which X =
{x1,x 2,x 3} and x1Px 2,x 1Ix3,x 2Ix3. Then, any choice function which
contains M(X,R)={x1,x 3} does not satisfy Undominance, since x1 weakly
dominates x3.
If we apply Undominance several times,
UD1(W)=UD(W); UD2(W)=UD(UD(W),R); ...
we are eliminating, in a sequential way, alternatives that are weakly
dominated in successive subsets of undominated elements of X.T h i s
sequence converges to a set UD∞(W) that represents the elements that
”survive” sequential elimination (Dutta and Laslier, 1999). Another desirable
property of choice functions is that of Monotonicity, which can be stated in
the following way:
Deﬁnition 6 Ac h o i c ef u n c t i o nF deﬁned in the family of weak tournaments
satisﬁes Monotonicity if for all weak tournaments W =( X,R),W   =
(X,R ) such that:
W = W  except for some pair of elements (x,y) such that
gW(x,y) >g W(x,y);Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 18
then, x ∈ F(W) ⇒ x ∈ F(W ).
Dutta and Laslier (1999) provide an example showing that the choice
function deﬁned by
S(W)=ES(UD∞(W))
does not satisfy Monotonicity. We will use the same example to show the
impossibility of ﬁnding a choice function that satisﬁes Monotonicity and
sequential elimination of weakly dominated alternatives:
Example 3 (Dutta and Laslier, 1999) Let X = {a1,a 2,a 3,b 1,b 2,b 3} and
the weak tournaments deﬁned below
gW ≡





0 −10 0 00
00 001 0
00 0 −10 1
00 00 −10

            

gW = gW except gW(a1,a 3)=1 gW(a3,a 1)=−1
gW = gW except gW(b1,b 3)=1 gW(b3,b 1)=−1
If we consider a non-empty valued choice function S satisfying sequential
Undominance, then:
S(W) ⊆ {a1,b 1} S(W )={b1} S(W  )={a1}
which is incompatible with Monotonicity.
We now introduce a selection of the Rational Essential choice function
by choosing, from the elements in ES∗(W), those that are not weaklyCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 19
dominated.
Deﬁnition 7 To each weak tournament W =( X,R),t h eUndominated-
Essential choice function assigns the set
UES(W)=ES∗(W) ∩ UD(W).
Theorem 3
a) ∅  = UES ⊂ ES∗.
b) For any weak tournament W =( X,R) such that M(X,R)  = ∅,
UES(W) ⊆ M(X,R).
c) The UES choice function satisﬁes Monotonicity.
d) The UES choice function satisﬁes Undominance.
Proof.
a) The fact that UES ⊂ ES∗ follows directly from the deﬁnition.
Therefore, we must only prove the non-emptiness of this choice function.
(1) Suppose that there is a maximal element; then it can only be
dominated by another maximal element, so there is a maximal element which
is not dominated and the choice function is non-empty, since it coincides with
the maximal elements which are undominated.
(2) Suppose now that there are no maximal elements (in this case, the
classes in M(X,R) will contain, at least, 3 elements). First note that an
element in a maximal class can only be dominated by another element in
that class. If, in the contrary, cl(x) is a maximal class such that there is
y/ ∈ cl(x) weak-dominating x, we know that xPz for some z ∈ cl(x) and thenCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 20
domination implies yPz,t h a ti s ,cl(y)Pcl(x), contradicting that cl(x) is a
maximal class.
We know that the Essential set, applied to the maximal classes of minimal
cardinality, contains undominated elements in this class (see Dutta and
Laslier, 1999), and then undominated in the whole set of alternatives.
b) Obvious from the deﬁnition of UES and from the fact that ES∗ is a
g-Condorcet choice function.
c) Let W =( X,R),W   =( X,R ) be two weak tournaments such that
W = W  except for some pair of elements (x,y) such that
gW(x,y) >g W(x,y);
and suppose x ∈ UES(W). Then, cl(x;W) ∈ mcM(W).W e h a v e t h e
following possibilities:
(1) y/ ∈ cl(x;W):
then cl(x;W )=cl(x;W),a n dx ∈ ES∗(W ). Moreover, it is obvious
that if x ∈ UD(W), then x ∈ UD(W ), so x ∈ UES(W ).
(2) y ∈ cl(x;W):t h e n ,a sW = W  except for x and y, the other classes
remain unchanged, and for the class cl(x,W  ) we have two possibilities:
cl(x;W )=cl(x,W) or cl(x,W ) ⊂ cl(x,W).
(2a) cl(x;W )=cl(x;W):
T h es a m ea r g u m e n ta si nc a s e( 1 )a p p l i e s ,b yv i r t u eo ft h ef a c tt h a tt h e
Essential choice function, which is applied to the maximal class, satisﬁes
Monotonicity.
(2b) In this case, we can write
cl(x;W)=cl(x;W ) ∪ BCondorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 21
As xP ∞b for all b ∈ cl(x;W), then x(P )∞b,s ocl(x;W ) is a maximal
class. If for some b ∈ cl(x;W), b(P )∞x, then b ∈ cl(x;W ). In other case,
b ∈ B, so we obtain that for all a ∈ cl(x;W ) and b ∈ B, a(P )∞b.T h e n
x belongs to a maximal class with minimal cardinality (the cardinality of
this class has decreased and the other classes are not modiﬁed). Let us
show that x ∈ ES(W  |cl(x,W)). We know that x ∈ ES(W |cl(x,W)) and, by
Monotonicity, x ∈ ES(W  |cl(x,W)), so there is an equilibrium (p,p) in the
game deﬁned by (W  |cl(x,W)) such that p(x) > 0. Consider the following
splitting of the equilibrium vector and the payoﬀ matrix, where the ﬁrst
component corresponds to the alternatives in cl(x,W  ), and the second one
t ot h eo n e si nB,







where we know that:
G12  0,G 21 = −G12 _ 0.
It is now easy to prove that
_




is an equilibrium in the game with payoﬀ matrix G11, which implies x ∈
ES(W  |cl(x;W)). Therefore, x ∈ UES(W ).
d) Follows directly from deﬁnition.Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements 22
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